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Why It Matters Whether There Is a
Higher Law or Not
Dallas Willard*
This conference was advertised as addressing the questions: "Is there a
higher law?" and "Does it matter?" I would like to use my time on this
occasion to deal with the latter question: Does it matter whether there is a
higher law or not? I will lay my cards on the table at the outset and say that
it matters and matters hugely. Now why would that be so?
Let us begin with the language of "higher" and "lower" and tone it down
a bit. It is not particularly helpful without a lot of explanation. The basic
issue underlying the distinction between higher and lower law is whether
there is any point exterior to the law as a social process from which that
process and its outcomes could be evaluated as justifiable or unjustifiable,
correct or incorrect, or-bluntly-right or wrong.
To say there is such a perspective is the essential meaning of claims to
the effect that there is a higher law. To say there is no such perspective
would, accordingly, be the meaning of the claim that there is no higher
law-there is just the social process and its outcomes. People, individually
or in groups, may or may not like the process or its outcomes, and may do
everything they can to foil or evade them, but there is no exterior framework
of general considerations from within which they can be evaluated as right
or wrong or abrogated. Any "legitimate" modification of the process itself
would have to come from its own internal dynamics.
In thinking about "the law" as a profession, there are two different ways
(at least) of regarding the public good that lawyers and "the law" serve:
1. "Legal Help"-Working in the system (the human social process) to
get what individuals and groups want. Here the aim of the persons involved
is to win (achieve the ends at issue), or at least to get "due process."
Resolution is a public good. "Justice" is at least a matter of receiving due
process.
2. "Justice" as an abstract ideal-Here the public good is seeing to it
that what is right is done, insofar as that is humanly possible. This is a view
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widely assumed by citizens and by the complaints of those dissatisfied with
the processes of the law. Due process does not guarantee justice.
In discussions and portrayals of law as a profession, the tensions and
conflicts between the two perspectives on "the law" and between the two
"public goods" related thereto are constantly in play.
When Oliver Wendell Holmes opens his famous essay on "The Path of
the Law" with this sentence, "When we study law we are not studying a
mystery but a well-known profession," he is not announcing a discovery he
or someone else made about what the law is.' He is announcing his resolve
to treat "the law" as merely a human social process and expressing his wish
and recommendation that others should do the same.' He wants to treat "the
law as a business with well understood limits."'3 That is perhaps a perfectly
legitimate decision for a practicing lawyer to make, but one that has no basis
as an indication of what "the law" really is or has any bearing upon
discussions of higher law. Holmes is, I think, disingenuous. His suggestion
that the alternative to his decision is to engage in study of a "mystery" only
reflects his commitment to the pragmatist theory of knowledge that was
swirling about him in those days.4 The idea that anything other than the
professional process and its predictable outcomes is a mystery, and therefore
unfathomable, is his way of giving the dog-in this case "higher law"--a
bad name before he shoots it.
There are two main reasons that convince me of the importance of there
being a "higher" law, in the sense of a general framework of consideration in
terms of which the judicial process and its outcomes can be evaluated and
possibly set aside or reformed. One relates to the internal dynamics of the
process, as a process that is "human, all too human.",5 The other has to do
with the relationship of legislation to the legal process.
I. The Law as a Human Process
The law as a human process is one within which individual human
beings, including lawyers and judges, are pursuing their own ends on the
basis of their personal understandings or ideas. What else is one to do? This
is, in general, unavoidable. The presence of an "appeals" system built into
the process is an explicit recognition that legal proceedings do not always go
as they should. Human factors such as bias, manipulation, ignorance, and
1. Oliver Wendel Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,457 (1897).
2. See generally id. at 457-78.
3. Id. at 459.
4. See id. at 457.
5. This phrase was made famous by Nietzsche but has implications beyond his meaning. See
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, MENSCHLICHES, ALLZUMENSCHLICHES (1878).
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ineptitude may distort the process of the law and must be recognized and
dealt with.
But there are distortions that no appeals system can correct. Sometimes
what comes out of due process is simply wrong and unjust. Historically, the
discretion of judges has been thought able to correct or ameliorate such
cases; as I understand it, that is still possible in some cases, but is
increasingly limited. Sometimes those who "win" in the process do so
simply because they are more attractive, have a more intelligent and
convincing lawyer, or have more money to spend to support their case or
undermine that of their opponents. This points us to factors in "the
business" of law over which due process has no control; these factors, in the
end, make for a situation where "equality before the law" can only be
viewed as an unapproachable ideal, and with reference to which only largely
futile gestures can be made. Of course we should do what we can to favor
what we know to be right in the legal process. But that must not blind us to
the all too frequent failures of our efforts to achieve "justice" in any sense
other than due process. The idea of a higher law makes it possible to
recognize and acknowledge where "justice" did not secure "what is right" or
"what should have been done." That recognition and acknowledgement is
crucial for the self-understanding and life of both the winners and losers at
court. It is important for their understanding of who they are, and of exactly
what they won and what they did not. It is also important for society's
understanding of what it has and does not have in the legal system, namely,
that that system does not determine what is right and wrong, good and bad,
but itself always stands under judgment. Justice from courts (or even
legislatures) will never do justice to justice. Legislation and the rightness
that is above due process are rooted in something higher still, and often it
cannot be accessed directly into the process.
II. The Relationship of Law and Legislation
The second main reason I am convinced of the existence of a higher law
that stands in judgment over what actually happens in the processes of the
court system is the relation of law to legislation. It is within the powers of
legislation to change the law and then to modify what is a correct or
incorrect outcome of the processes of the law. I presume that legislation can
also deal with what is acceptable or not in how legal proceedings themselves
are conducted. But it is also the case that the legislature passes laws with
respect to various kinds of situations and events in ordinary life outside the
world of legal affairs. In so doing it often references what is good, right, and
fair in terms of general moral understanding. (Though one could hardly say
that legislation itself cannot go wrong.)
To say that there is no external perspective, no higher law, from which
the processes and outcomes of legal procedures can be evaluated and
possibly overridden-or, indeed, which serves as the foundation of those
processes and their outcomes-is to fail to have an adequate view of those
processes and outcomes themselves. It is to fail to see them as they actually
are and as they actually function in human life. For some purposes it could
be that one should disregard all the broader questions and just focus on how
to work the process as it is to get what you or your client wants. But to hold
that that is all there is to law is very close to making Holmes's decision as to
what the profession of law and the aim of the legal system is essentially
about.6 That is a decision which sets one at odds with the view of law as
concerned with what is right, and a decision which few could accept as
adequate to the idealism that makes law an honorable undertaking. To say
there is no higher law really means that there can be no issue as to what is
morally right with regard to the conduct and outcome of legal procedures.
That surely undermines the confidence in law that is essential to its use and
essential to the health and stability of a society and human existence based
upon law.
Thus it is extremely important that there be a higher law or laws, and
that these be recognized as such by those engaged in the practice of law and
by society at large. Of course there will be occasions in which appeals to
such law or laws would not be appropriate and might even be detrimental.
Practical wisdom has to discern those occasions and make allowance for
them.
So: The law as a process is essentially something that stands under
criticism, and therefore under a higher point of view, and if you wish, a
higher law or higher order of things.
Now why does that matter? It matters because if law is to prevail in
human life, it must be something that generally inspires respect, and where
enforcement is the rare, though always possible, situation.7 Kant's term
"Achtung," which is usually translated as "respect," conveys a vital notion:
"Respect," Kant says, "is properly the representation of a worth that thwarts
my self-love," where "self-love" is understood as simply fulfilling desires,
doing what I or someone else wants to be done. 8 Law is not to be simply an
expression of human desire, where the stronger, better placed, cleverer, or
luckier have their way. My claim is that only as subject to a higher law
6. See generally Holmes, supra note 1.
7. For instance, the symbolisms of the court room are tied to respect.
8. IMMANUEL KANT, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, in ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY § 401
at n. 14 (James W. Ellington trans., Hackett Publ'g Co. 2d ed. 1994) (1785).
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perspective can human law and its associated processes be held in that
regard which will enable them to function as law, and not as mere
descriptions of how certain official personages behave, or may be expected
to behave. In short, if there were no higher law, there would be no law at all
in the form of human enactments. We would only have administrative
arrangements with the power of government to back them up. That is why it
matters whether or not there is a higher law.
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